Behind it we can be in a mind of others easily but otherwise at the matter pf fact if we are asked what self-identity is, we absolutely have a trouble to answer. It is shown in next Sydney Shoemaker’s description ( Self-knowledge and self-identity).
( abbreviated in fore part) Suppose that I have an uninterrupted memory of the interval between a certain time yesterday and the present moment. Suppose that now I remember a certain “idea,” say an image, that occured yesterday, remember also the substance or subject that had that idea, and can therefore be sure that nothing has been substituted for it, and that it is identical with substance that perceives my present ideas. If I could remember this then surely I could remember that at some point another substance was substituted for it, and know that it was not the same as the substance was substituted for it, and know that it was not the same as the substance that perceives my present ideas. Given that I can perceive a thing of a certain sort, if my memory of what observed ( perceived, was aware of, was conscious of) between yesterday and the present could inform me that a thing of that sort I observe now it the same as one that I remember existing yesterday, then it could inform me that a thing of that sort that I observe now is not the same as one that I remember existing yesterday. As I said in Chapter Two, by appealing to the fact that
we consistently “lose sight” od our past selves as grounds for doubt as to whether we always remain the same substance, Locke implies that one substance could be replaced by another, and that if our consciousness were not interrupted we would detect such changes were they to occur. For it is only because our consciousness is interrupted that he thinks that such substitution, surely it is conceivable that someday we might detect one. Suppose, however, that were to remember that the substance which had the idea (saw the image) yesterday had been replaced by another substance and was not the same as the substance that has my present ideas. If the identity of a person consists in, or essentially involves, the identity of a substance, then in this case I would have to say that the remembered idea belonged to someone other than myself. And this, as Locke saw, is absurd; if I remember the image the it must have been I say that the identity of a person does not involve the identity of a substance( a view that I have argued to be unintelligible one can observe, and remember, that a material object, or another person, has or has not remained the same( has or has not been replaced by something else) during a certain interval of time, one cannot observe or remember that a mental substance, or oneself, has or has not remained the same. ( Four Self-identity and the Contents of Memory, p.146~p.147)
What we read from its Shoemaker’s description, it’s the truth that we don’t remember our actions observing them as the method. Then because of it the method of proof that a thing seen yesterday and it seen now is the same doesn’t be judged as identity of personality, its axiom in mind is talked here. Its self identity isn’t identity that we know with observation to others as objective standard( it caused only a assessment that we can know that apple you see is it I see as the same) ,namely it’s exceptional specific, transcendental, sole thing. This idea can be thought being based on Descartes.(Locke took it over), but Russell also took it over, Shoemaker identified it.
And one who took over Shoemaker’s idea is Hitoshi Nagai.
Then just because of all of it, value originally in judgment purely is individual property, in the truth nobody can trust any other persons except myself to judge value itself, we can close up others’ entity. It’s double characterized meaning only philosophy holds.
Namely the idea that others’ judgment shouldn’t applied to pierce value as claim of individual responsibility truly works as we need solidified value necessarily in self mind disliking unstableness of it. Solidification which works in our self mind aquires the character of us that we can show our value vision to others as we like. It is caused from that we’ve already been aware of value solidification’s sharing in anybody. A awareness of it in individuals just makes anxiety too. Because of it we jump at the gun to authorize value in deleting anxiety. We are apt to have an illusion that any values which include law are apriori outside exisitence. Then we misjudge the thing as we can observe like a question apple you see is it I see or not and the thing as value itself combining together. A description by Shoemaker can lead us to be aware of our doxa.
2011年2月14日月曜日
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